Tibet was annexed by China in 1950, a year after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the civil war. The Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 and remains Tibet’s spiritual leader in exile.
China observers in India believe Beijing has been doing propaganda on Tibet since 1950 when its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet. They believe that by using the name Xizang, instead of Tibet, China is putting its stamp on the region and trying to erase Tibetans’ cultural identity.
It is all seen as in line with China’s future plans in Tibet. “This has serious security implications for India as well since China calls Arunachal Pradesh as Zangnan, a part of Xizang,” said an observer based in New Delhi, adding that clarity on this from segments of the Chinese civil society would be extremely helpful in countering Beijing’s narratives on Tibet.
Officials claim the latest ‘White Paper’ on Tibet, released on November 10 by China’s State Council, “unsurprisingly” presents an overwhelmingly flowery image of the situation in Tibet. While there is a barrage of data and claimed achievements in Tibet under Xi Jinping, the ‘White Paper’ is silent on the core agenda of the party-state in Tibet, such as the colonial boarding school system and the massive relocation programmes, both of which have had a tremendous impact on the Tibetan people and their culture.
Observers maintained that the ‘White Paper’ on Tibet was similar to Mao Zedong’s (founder of the People’s Republic of China) approach to Tibet in the 1950s. In 1951, the CCP Tibet Work Committee, headed by Zhang Jingwu and Zhang Guohua, reported that “the high tide of the socialist transformation has emerged all over the country” and that “the minority areas neighbouring Tibet are all preparing to conduct democratic reforms”. This is similar to what is being reported in numerous white papers being brought out now on Tibet’s development and how Tibetans enjoy prosperity in ‘Xizang’.
When it had appeared that the Dalai Lama would seek asylum in India, the CCP leadership tried to woo him back. Premier Zhou Enlai travelled to India in 1956-57 and met with the Dalai Lama to persuade him to return to Lhasa. During those meetings, while conveying Mao’s sentiment, Zhou Enlai promised the Dalai Lama that reforms would not be introduced in Tibet (including the Chamdo area) without consultations. He also promised that no reforms would be carried out during the second Five-Year Plan, meaning for another six years.
As documented by Chinese scholar Chen Jian in his 2006 article for the Journal of Cold War Studies, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders found it necessary and achievable to combine military operations with sophisticated diplomatic and ‘united front’ work, especially toward Tibet’s political and monastic elites.
Xi Jinping is also seen to be using political narratives the way Mao did. It is also maintained that some Chinese handles, along with media organisations across the world, lap up Chinese propaganda dictated by the CCP.
Many exiled Tibetans accuse Xi Jinping of religious repression and eroding their culture. As a result, there have been many protests, including self-immolations, thus making the issue of Tibet very sensitive for Beijing. It will then be interesting to see how this classic playbook of Chinese narrative plays out in other South Asian countries.